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Reviewed by Burke Marshallt
Of the attorneys and teachers mentioned in this book, Charles
Hamilton Houston brings the vaguest flickers of recognition to white
lawyers. Yet he was the first, and among the most gifted, of the extra-
ordinary group who guided the litigation leading to Brown v. Board
of Education' and its enormous progeny of case law. There is a chair
named for him at Howard Law School; based on the accomplishments
and legacy of its namesake, it deserves to be the preeminent chair in
legal education. Consider the exceptional distinction of only some of
the black lawyers who worked as his colleagues and his apprentices:
Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter, William Henry Hastie, Spotts-
wood Robinson III, James M. Nabrit, Jr. (and later James M. Nabrit
III), William T. Coleman, Constance Baker Motley, and Franklin H.
Williams. They were, of course, assisted by some white lawyers, in-
cluding several distinguished legal academics associated with the Yale
Law School; indeed, a white man, Jack Greenberg, succeeded Thur-
good Marshall as the director of the NAACP Legal and Educational
Defense Fund, the organization that spearheaded the litigation. But
those white men and women, with the exception of Mr. Green-
berg, were dabbling part-time. Credit for the stunning professional
success of the strategy and tactics of the litigation culminating in
Brown rests firmly on the work of black men and women, barred at
the time from jobs in the mainstream of their profession, from educa-
tion in most of the nation's law schools, and, in the states where they
did most of their work, from even the simplest conveniences of the
life of a litigator on the road, such as a room in a good motel or a
meal at a decent restaurant.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Richard Kluger's book2 is a detailed account of the work of these
men and women. Based on extensive research of the kind that is
possible when many of the actors are still alive, the book is rich in
anecdotes about those who did the courtroom work, anecdotes colorful
and often funny, probably embellished over the years, and perhaps
even apocryphal in part. Compassionately, and sometimes movingly,
the author describes the lives and courage of the black people who,
as clients of Charles Houston and his colleagues, put themselves and
their families out in front of their communities and the society in
which they lived, so as to become persons with standing to bring a
justiciable case or controversy before a federal court.
As popular, almost contemporary, history, written by a man with
the experience and technique of a journalist, Simple Justice is justifi-
ably subject to the criticism that it does not reflect a complete under-
standing of legal processes. This is particularly evident in Mr. Kluger's
attempt to describe and analyze the work of the Supreme Court and
of various individual Justices. 3 Nevertheless, a review of Simple Justice
should start with an unstinting and unqualified commendation of the
book-particularly to lawyers, law students, and anyone considering
the law as a profession. Its subject matter, the American struggle for
racial and human justice, inexorably reveals the intricate splendor of
the American constitutional structure and the creative invention of
the process of constitutional litigation that the structure makes pos-
sible, indeed necessary. It describes lawyers' work at its pinnacle-
intellectually demanding, technically inscrutable, difficult both phys-
ically and mentally, focused in the disciplined confines of a judicially
permissible record, using the process of law simultaneously to affect
the decision of government on great issues and to gain for a client,
2. R. KLL'GER, SIMPLE JUsTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited by page number only).
3. The section dealing with the Brown decision itself includes significant materials
from the papers of Justices Burton, Frankfurter, and Jackson, materials that suggest the
ebb and flow of the Court's decisionmaking, extending even into the Justices' con-
ference room. Mr. Kluger supplemented this spotty record by using it, in the classic
journalistic manner, as a lever to elicit interviews with some law clerks who served during
the October 1952, 1953, and 1954 Terms. In this way he obtained a fair amount of
original and valuable historical matter concerning the views of individual Justices on the
school segregation issue. The most controversial bit of evidence of this sort, however,
concerns the views not of a Justice but of one of the law clerks, William H. Rehnquist,
who was then clerk to Justice Jackson. In a lengthy footnote (pp. 606-09), Mr. Kluger
argues that a memorandum written by Mr. Rehnquist to Justice Jackson, urging re-
affirmance of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reflected Mr. Rehnquist's own
views on the cases, rather than those of the Justice. If so, this would conflict with Mr.
Rehnquist's testimony on the point during his confirmation hearings in 1971. But Mr.
Kluger's evidence does not seem compelling. In my judgment, an equally plausible inter-
pretation corresponds to Mr. Rehnquist's testimony: that the memorandum was re-
quested by Justice Jackson so that he could evaluate the strongest argument to be made
in favor of Plessy.
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and an enormous number of other people in the same situation, the
relief to which he is entitled. As the foreword points out, the nature
of the lawsuit that the book chronicles, the story that it has to tell,
requires an imposing length; yet Kluger writes with an ease that makes
its reading a pleasure, and he describes events that ended, after all, in
a triumph of law.
Simple Justice does, however, have serious limitations, for Mr.
Kluger writes as a journalist, not as a legal scholar. An underlying
problem is apparent in the title, so apt a phrase for Mr. Kluger's own
assessment of Brown and related decisions that it seems deceptively
inevitable. 4 The justice that was done in Brown can be fairly described
by the adjective "simple" in one of its meanings-that of "[a]bsolute,
unqualified." 5 The trouble is that Mr. Kluger plainly also believes the
adjective is accurate in another sense-that of "[n]ot compound, con-
sisting of only one element, . . . not analysable."6 From that belief
stem serious limitations on the book's scholarship, for the justice dis-
pensed by Brown, whatever else it is, is not in that sense simple.
One example of these limitations is Mr. Kluger's notion that con-
stitutional litigation is entirely a political process, with issues being
manipulated by the Justices solely to achieve preconceived substantive
ends. In his foreword, Mr. Kluger refers to the Court as "these
insulated nine men [to whom] the nation has increasingly brought its
most vexing social and political problems," T a loose but not outrageous
description of the process. But he then goes on to say that the problems
"come in the guise of private disputes between only the litigating
parties," even though "everybody understands that this is a legal fic-
tion and merely a convenient political device." s To traditional scholars
of constitutional and Supreme Court history this characterization of
the process contains not only loose but fighting words. It ignores the
entire development, starting in 1792, of the restriction of the Supreme
Court's role to the decision of "cases and controversies" in a constitu-
tional sense.
The frame of mind, not just the language used in a short introduc-
tion, is the problem. The author's approach to the case law that grew
from the Civil Rights Cases9 and Plessy' ° to Brown is almost totally
4. Mr. Kluger uses the phrase "simple justice" to describe the decision itself on the
occasion of its rendering. P. 710.




9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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result-oriented, conceding not even a presumption of principled good
faith, much less careful analysis, to the grounds advanced by the Court
for its decisions. An example will suffice. Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education" hardly qualifies as a masterpiece of
judicial craftsmanship, but it did involve a serious problem of remedy.
The school board was maintaining separate school systems, in which
the whites had a high school but the blacks did not. The plaintiffs at
first sought relief against the tax collector for permitting public funds
to be expended in that fashion, but they did not appeal from the
denial of that specific prayer for relief by the Georgia courts. Nor did
they attack the separate school systems as such, except, apparently, in
oral argument before the Supreme Court. In any event, Plessy had
just been decided, and the separate-but-equal issue was not really open.
The question as framed by the Supreme Court on the record before
it was whether the Fourteenth Amendment required the Georgia
court to close the white high school. The Court held that it did not,
finding no "hostility" to the blacks, but also stressing its reluctance to
grant the particular kind of relief requested. 12 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Harlan, a hero in other pages of Simple Justice for
his dissents in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, wrote that the case
would have been a different one if the plaintiffs had sought to compel
the school system to maintain a black high school as well, and if the
element of "hostility" had been present. 13 But even if so framed, the
issue of relief ultimately would have involved the complex question
of the power of the federal courts to compel the states to tax for a
particular purpose. A similar question was raised after Brown by the
closing of the schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia in 1959;14
resolution took five years of litigation. The Cumming decision may be
plainly wrong, but "grievous pettifoggery"', it is not.
Even more serious, Mr. Kluger fails to recognize the enormous
significance of the decision by the NAACP lawyers to ground the
challenge to separate school systems in part on educational theory. The
Court's apparent adoption of an educational theory as the doctrinal
underpinning of Brown has raised problems of legitimacy and relief
11. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
12. Id. at 545.
13. Id.
14. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
15. P. 83. Mr. Kluger elsewhere calls the unanimous decision in Grovey ti. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935), "judicial sophistry at its most flagrant." Pp. 167-68. Grovey upheld
the exclusion of blacks from voting in Texas Democratic primaries because conducting
the primaries was a party function and did not constitute state action. The opinion does
not represent modern state action analysis, but it was joined by Justices Brandeis, Cardozo,
and Stone, and at the time was not considered to be a radical departure from doctrine.
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that were brilliantly examined by the late Alexander Bickel.'G Mr.
Kluger is evidently oblivious to the jurisprudential significance of the
Court's seeming reliance on the NAACP's educational theory; he
describes it, admittedly at great length, only as an element of litiga-
tion strategy.' 7
But that is what this book is about-the litigation that led to Brown
and the lawyers who conducted it. In spite of the book's scholarly
shortcomings, Mr. Kluger tells this triumphant story masterfully. After
reading Simple Justice, most good lawyers will wish that they too had
been a part of the process it describes.
16. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 119-66 (1970). I say
"apparent adoption" by the Court because its use of per curiam opinions and mem-
orandum orders in subsequent cases, involving such varied state facilities as golf courses
and swimming pools, simply cannot be explained on the ground of an educational theory.
In brief, the underlying educational theory identified by Professor Bickel as "another
element" in Brown is that black children do not distinguish between de jure and de
facto reasons for their segregated schooling, and since separation "from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone," Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), the public
schools, as instrumentalities of the state, have a constitutional obligation to give black
children a racially integrated education. The Court's use of the word "solely" and of
implicit state action concepts makes unclear, at least to me, that the Court actually had
this theory in mind. Yet the opinion is imprecise and certainly susceptible of that in-
terpretation. The decision then would have rested in part on an unproved and really
untested theory as to the educational effect of racial school segregation (which, absent a
dual school system, simply reflects a society segregated residentially, economically, and
socially). See, e.g., J. COLEMAN et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1965);
Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems,
82 YALE L.J. 409, 409-21 (1973) (citing numerous studies of the impact of public school
finance systems on educational quality). This interpretation of Brown is still an under-
lying issue in current school litigation. Cf., e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
196 (1973) (noting district court's use of racial statistics "to signify educationally inferior
schools" but not "to define a 'segregated' school in the de jure context").
17. Pp. 315-45, 396-425.
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Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access. By Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. Pp. xiii, 296. $17.50.
Reviewed by Floyd Abramst
In law the moments are few when a genuinely innovative idea
flashes onto the intellectual landscape. Such a moment occurred less
than a decade ago when Professor Jerome Barron published the first
article of an extraordinary series.' Professor Barron contended that the
First Amendment should be construed to require the press to print-
or, at least, to permit legislatures to require the press to print-articles
that its editors and publishers chose not to print. As initially phrased
and as often repeated, Barron's thesis was that First Amendment theory
was "in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression, a belief
that the 'marketplace of ideas' is freely accessible." 2 Since many ideas,
particularly unorthodox ones, have no effective outlet, and since the
"right to be heard" was, in Barron's view, central to the First Amend-
ment, he urged that First Amendment theory be "liberated from its
outmoded underpinnings" and that newspapers be required, at least in
some circumstances, to print such ideas.3
The initial reaction to Barron's view was enthusiastic. Law reviews
published a substantial body of commentary generally favorable to
the ideological "liberation" of the First Amendment. 4 Judicial deci-
sions initially lent support to the thesis that in the interest of First
Amendment "values," the government could compel the media to
broadcast 5 or publish certain material.
t Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale University; member, New York Bar. In various
cases referred to in the review, the reviewer has participated as counsel on behalf of
journalists, publishers, and broadcasters.
1. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641
(1967); see J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRruss FOR WHOM? (1973); Barron, An Emerging
First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 478 (1969);
Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 766 (1970).
2. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641,
1641 (1967).
3. Id. at 1678.
4. For a compilation of some of this literature, see Lange, The Role of the Access
Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media, 52 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1973).
5. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Hale v. FCC, 425
F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring).
6. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47 n.15 (1971); Tornillo v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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But the idea of compelled access, at least as it related to the print
press, was to be short-lived. The Supreme Court's decision in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee7 signaled
the beginning of the end. Holding that broadcasters were not obliged
by the First Amendment to carry unwanted editorial advertisements,
the Court strongly emphasized the First Amendment right of broad-
casters to make programming decisions.- The end came with the
unanimous decision of the Court a year later in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,9 the case holding unconstitutional a Florida
statute requiring newspapers to print the replies of candidates who
had been attacked editorially while they were running for office.
Today, only nine years after Barron's first article, the access con-
troversy already has an antique ring to it.1O Yet the movement Barron
inspired-and it was no less than that-did raise serious questions about
the meaning and the future of the First Amendment. It deserves, at
the very least, a fair and sober obituary. Professor Benno Schmidt's
new book 1 is all that and more.
Schmidt begins by discussing the notion of compelled access in First
Amendment history and theory. He then reviews the common percep-
tion that control of the media is overly concentrated and that news is
inaccurately presented, a perception that gave impetus and strength to
the access movement. Next, Schmidt skillfully surveys the arguments
for and against access to the print press, exploring areas as diverse as
libel, antitrust, "commercial speech," and the "public forum" cases.
For example, Schmidt considers the contention that New York Times
7. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
8. The Court noted, for example, that
[for better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this
power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress pro-
vided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to presere higher %alues. Tile
presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted
the reality that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other
than a spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part
of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression.
Id. at 124-25.
9. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Professor Barron personally argued Tornillo on behalf of the
president of a Florida teacher's union who had been attacked by the Miami Heyald.
10. Of course, the requirement of adherence to governmentally defined "fairness" still
persists in the telecommunications area, but even in that discrete field it remains subject
to continuing challenge, refinement, and limitation. See, e.g., Straus Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). A recent ruling emphasizing the
limited nature of the powers of the FCC over television content is Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 45 U.S.L.W. 2241 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1976).
11. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC AccEss (1976) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
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Co. v. Sullivan12 and later libel cases so limited the right of individuals
to recover for nonmaliciously published defamatory material that access
requirements should be enacted to redress the balance. Schmidt ex-
amines Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,13 and persuasively concludes that
the concern for the demise of defamation law is overblown,' 4 a con-
clusion buttressed by cases decided since the publication of his book.'3
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the book is its ex-
quisitely drafted section on access to television and radio. There
Schmidt best displays the wide range of his abilities: the overview
of broadcast regulation law is as perceptive as any that has been
written, and the discussions of both the "equal opportunities" provi-
sion and the "fairness doctrine" are pointed, accurate, and provoca-
tive."' Indeed, given the breadth and complexity of the issues Schmidt
considers, the care and conciseness of his treatment are remarkable. 1 7
Yet, for all the skill of Schmidt's analysis, I must dissent from his
most important argument: his harsh disapproval, indeed denunciation,
of the Tornibo decision. I should, in fairness, state at the outset that I
write as one who believes that Tornillo, even more than New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, was an occasion for dancing in the streets.' 8
Schmidt disagrees. He characterizes Tornibo as "something of a curi-
osity"' 9 and its holding as "almost devoid of reasoned support." 20
Tornillo's use of precedents is said to be "disingenuous," 21 its justifica-
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. Pp. 84-85.
15. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
16. The "equal opportunities" provision of the Communications Act is found in 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the FCC's "fairness doctrine" derives implicit
legislative support from the same section. See pp. 141, 159.
This portion of the book may be read profitably in conjunction with Fred W.
Friendly's new study of the fairness doctrine. F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD
GuYs AND THE FRsTr AMEND.ENT (1976). Much of Friendly's book is based upon personal
investigative journalism. In the course of describing the Red Lion litigation, Friendly
reveals that the Democratic National Committee deliberately set out to inhibit right-
wing radio broadcasts by demanding free reply time. His story is evidence of the
potentially repressive effects of governmentally compelled access.
17. In the high tradition of book reviewers, I have combed the book for factual
errors-and located but one. Schmidt, in the course of suggesting that the emergence of
television network news has led to a concentration of presidential and vice presidential
candidates from the Senate, observes that since 1956 "every person nominated for these
offices has been either an incumbent or former Senator, with the exception of Spiro
Agnew." P. 65. One may forgive Schmidt for not foretelling the rise of our new President;
neither Sargent Shriver nor William Miller, however, has likely forgotten his own
performance on the national scene so quickly.
18. It was Alexander Meiklejohn whose enthusiasm for New York Times reached as
far as his toes. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
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tion for its result "surprisingly apologetic," 22 and its response to op-
posing arguments "lame. ' 23 Strong statements all, yet all statements
that I believe to be unsupportable.
Tornillo, of course, is hardly immune from scholarly attack. As
Schmidt contends, 24 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Tornillo relies
heavily on opinions that assumed the unconstitutionality of access
requirements without justifying that assumption substantively.2 5 But
Chief Justice Burger's opinion claimed no more of the earlier opinions
than that they had long since placed a "judicial gloss" on the First
Amendment strongly pointing to the unconstitutionality of compulsory
access.26 And they had. Schmidt is also correct in observing that the
Court's citation to previous opinions is, in a sense, selective.27 For
instance, in reversing the decision of the Florida Supreme Court,28
the Tornillo Court not only failed to cite or consider the case on which
the state court had in good part relied-Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC29-but set forth views facially inconsistent with those expressed in
Red Lion.30 Though the failure of the Court to grapple with Red Lion




25. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945).
26. 418 U.S. at 254.
27. Pp. 230-31.
28. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418
U.S. 241 (1974).
29. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The failure to deal with Red Lion might be explained, as
one judge has urged, on the ground that the law of the print press and that of broadcast
journalism are so unrelated that the Court perceived no need to advert to any broad-
cast decisions. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(Tamm, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). However, this seems an unlikely
explanation. More likely, the Court chose not to explicate Red Lion further until a
telecommunications case requires it to do so. Red Lion must surely rank as one of the
more besieged unanimous opinions of recent years. See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). The
growing doubts of two members of the Court about the wisdom of the decision are set
forth in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 146,
148 (1973) (Stewart, Douglas, JJ., concurring, respectivel,). It is difficult to predict
whether other members of the Court will come to share these doubts. But the failure
of the Court to deal with Red Lion in Tornillo is probably more a productof the
Court's reluctance to treat the subject than a conclusion that the fields are unrelated.
For Schmidt's provocative speculation on this question, see p. 241.
30. For example, in Red Lion the Court rejected as "speculative" the argument that
the fairness doctrine is likely to result in self-censorship by broadcasters. 395 U.S. at 393.
The Court's conclusion is utterly irreconcilable with its conclusion in Tornillo that
"under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be
blunted or reduced" and that "Government-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.'" 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (footnote
omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
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From Tornillo's commencement through its conclusion, the ultimate
issue was one of power-the power of the press to decide what to print
versus the power of governmental entities, whether legislative or
judicial, to tell it what to print. "From the very nature of things,"
Justice Story once wrote, "the absolute right of decision, in the last
resort, must rest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it is susceptible
of abuse." 3' That the press sometimes abused the power to determine
what to print had been acknowledged by the Court prior to Tornillo.32
But that the press should be free to decide what to print, subject only
to later criminal or civil penalties, had also been established in a series
of cases all but totally prohibiting prior restraints on publication. 3
Tornilo thus raised the question whether a government powerless
to impose prior restraints on the publication of certain views had the
power to require the publication of others. The answer of the Court
in Tornillo is worth repeating:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment
because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper
is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment,
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper,
and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content
of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials--
whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved
to this time.34
It is difficult to fathom precisely what it is that Schmidt finds so
objectionable, not to say unreasoned, in this conclusion. It is con-
sistent with the many prior intimations by the Court that access re-
31. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816).
32. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 124 (1973).
33. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
713 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Post-Tornillo decisions include
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975), and Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976). In Nebraska the concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan (joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall) urged that the only exception to the
prohibition on prior restraints on news reporting is a single narrow category of cases in
the national security area. Id. at 2818. Concurring opinions of Justices Stevens and
White (as well as Justice White's concurring opinion in Tornillo itself), although not as
far-reaching as that of Justice Brennan, also appear sympathetic to this view.
34. 418 U.S. at 258 (footnote omitted).
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quirements would be held unconstitutional; the principle established
by the case is surely a neutral one-one which may be easily applied
in future cases in a predictable, if not always certain, fashion;3 and
the decision is one that does not shy from asserting and defending its
central theme-the need to protect the "exercise of editorial control
and judgment."301
Schmidt suggests that the decision is internally inconsistent: its con-
clusion that editorial decisions " 'whether fair or unfair' " are constitu-
tionally protected, he contends, is broader than its earlier statement
that what is at issue in the case is "[c]ompelling editors or publishers
to publish that which ' "reason" tells them should not be published'." 37
Given the Court's reference to the word "reason," Schmidt infers that
an "unreasonable" refusal to publish may not be protected.3 8 But so
to read the Court's reference to the word "reason" would be incon-
sistent not only with later language in Tornillo itself30 but also with
Associated Press v. United States,40 the case from which the Court in
Tornillo was quoting. There is simply no basis for Schmidt's reliance
on language in Associated Press as support for his contention that
Tornillo can conceivably be read to permit judicial decisionmaking as
to what to print.
Equally unpersuasive is Schmidt's suggestion that Tornillo is flawed
because it "betrays no hint of relativity." 41 The absolute "constitu-
tional principle announced" by Tornillo, Schmidt concludes, "is not
consistent with other rules grounded in the First Amendment." 42 But
it is. The Court's rulings in Tornillo and other recent cases indicate
35. A concun'ing opinion of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist in Tornillo explicitly
leaves open the possibility that statutes requiring newspapers that have printed defama-
tory falsehoods to print retractions may be constitutional. Id. Schmidt appears to view
such a result as likely. See p. 246. I think it unlikely in light of the strong emphasis in
Tornillo on the risks of judicial dictation of what may be printed. In any event,
Tornillo is surely more predictable in its application than New York Times was-or is.
36. 418 U.S. at 258.
37. Pp. 229-30 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, 254).
38. P. 231.
39. This language is set out at p. 365 supra.
40. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). In Associated Press, the Court stated:
It is argued that the decree interferes with freedom "to print as and how one's
reason or one's interest dictates." The decree does not compel AP or its members to
permit publication of anything which their "reason" tells them should not be pub-
lished. It only provides that after their "reason" has permitted publication of news,
they shall not, for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to limit its
publication.
Id. at 20 n.18.
41. P. 13. Schmidt is not alone in his qualms about the breadth of the Court's
language. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cur. L. REV. 20, 50 (1975) (Tornillo "is so sweeping that it is hard to believe the Court
could possibly mean what it said.")
42. P. 13.
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that the degree of First Amendment protection afforded the press
depends on the extent to which the alleged intrusion on press freedom
impinges on the editorial decisionmaking process. The cases fall into
three categories, each of which involves a different degree of protection.
First, the press enjoys virtually absolute protection when the state,
through the judiciary or otherwise, attempts to determine either what
must not be printed (i.e., prior restraint)4 3 or what must be printed
(i.e., access).44 Second, when the state seeks to punish the press after
publication, the First Amendment requires an extremely high, although
by no means absolute, degree of protection.4 5 Third, and least pro-
tected, is the right of the press to gather information. Here there is
extensive First Amendment protection, but it is based upon a
balancing test that often provides the press with less protection than
that afforded under the other two categories.46 So viewed, Tornillo is
hardly absolutist; rather, it is representative of the vast freedom af-
forded the press at the apex of its First Amendment protection. 47
Ultimately, Tornillo demanded a choice of First Amendment
philosophies-a choice between the possibility of more expression
reaching more people, but decreed and enforced by the machinery of
the State, and the principle that "[fjor better or worse, editing is what
editors are for."'48 In Tornillo the Court concluded that any "intrusion
into the function of editors" would pose too grave a threat to the
freedom of the press. 49 As Justice White observed in his concurrence:
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as
the unhappy experiences of other nations where government has
been allowed to meddle in the internal editorial affairs of news-
papers. Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of
43. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
45. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (privacy); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (contempt).
46. See, e.g., Pell %. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 45 U.S.L.W. 2242 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1976); Goodale,
Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HAsTINGS
L.J. 709 (1975); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1974).
47. Schmidt reaches a different conclusion when he analyzes Tornillo in the context
of other First Amendment decisions. Pp. 232-33. He correctly observes that "[i]n other
First Amendment contexts . . . the scope of constitutional protection varies." P. 233.
Schmidt concludes that since "all other rules emanating from [the First] Amendment
are relati'e," the principle of Tornillo "probably is destined for uncharted qualifications
and exceptions." Id. His error lies in his failure to recognize that Tornillo is located
at the apex of the First Amendment hierarchy.
4t8. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124
(1973).
49. 418 U.S. at 258.
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controlling the press might be, we prefer "the power of reason as
applied through public discussion" and remain intensely skeptical
about those measures that would allow government to insinuate
itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press. 0
In a world in which Indian newspaper editors have been accused of
not printing enough photographs of Prime Minister Gandhi on their
front pages,0 ' and Peruvian newspaper editors have been required by
law to publish all official governmental communications on their
front pages, 52 Justice White's fears do not appear excessive.r 3
As even its critics recognize, Tornillo is a "landmark in First Amend-
ment theory." 4 Its rejection of what Justice Stewart had earlier
referred to as "blind pursuit" of First Amendment " 'values' " at the
expense of the First Amendment itself 55 marks it as a seminal ruling.
The scholarly judgment passed on such a decision is influential,
particularly that of so distinguished a figure as Schmidt. As he correctly
notes:
When Supreme Court decisions are not grounded in reason, they
are fragile. A subsequent Court, when exposed to similar prob-
lems, is less likely to follow an earlier decision if the logic of that
50. Id. at 259 (Vhite, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
51. 24 IPI REP., Sept. 1975, at 4. A recent summary of the state of the press in India
concludes as follows:
In the Government's view, what has happened to the newspapers is that they have
become more responsible during the 19 months of the new political order since they
no longer devote their columns to the views of dissidents who, as the Prime
Minister says repeatedly, "had no popular following."
Information Minister V.C. Shukla, asked recently about what used to be a con-
flict between government and the press, replied: "Now there is full understanding
between the two."
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
52. L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § A, at 16, col. 1. The Peruvian military junta called
the law a "freedom of the press" law. Id.
53. Past studies support Justice White's warning. A survey of the International Press
Institute reported that
[c]ompelling newspapers to publish official handouts or any other material inspired
by the government is certainly one of the worst abuses of power. It is current prac-
tice in totalitarian countries. In [Franco's] Spain, for example, papers [were] bound
to publish material issued by the government, but [had] to pretend that it [was] put
out by the newspaper office itself.
Int'l Press Inst., Government Pressures on the Press 99 (IPI Survey No. 4, 1955), reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE SURVEYS NUMBERS 1-6 (1972). Further examples were
cited from Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Ecuador, Argentina, and Colombia. Id. at 100-01.
Another IPI publication detailed the activities of totalitarian governments in the Soviet
Union, East Germany, and Spain in issuing press "directives" requiring the publication
of government-inspired news. Int'l Press Inst., The Press in Authoritarian Countries
23-25, 87-89, 134-45 (IPI Survey No. 5, 1959), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL PRESS INsTITUTE
SuRvEys NUMBERS 1-6 (1972).
54. E.g., p. 237.
55. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145
(concurriag opinion).
In Defense of Tornillo
decision is not visible. It will be more difficult to persuade new
personnel on the Court of the sanctity of the earlier result. Com-
mentators will create doubts. If [Tornillo] is not a reasoned
treatment, political and popular pressures for guarantees of access
will build up again.50
Schmidt's "doubts" about Tornillo and repeated suggestions that it is
not "reasoned" are thus all the more troubling.
Yet, at least to this reader, they remain unpersuasive. Tornillo is not
only a "reasoned treatment"; it is that most unlikely and attractive of
all governmental acts-a renunciation of power.
56. P. 13.
The Just War Doctrine
Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular
Concepts, 1200-1740. By James Turner Johnson. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975. Pp. x, 291. $12.50.
Reviewed by G.I.A.D. Draper
Like natural law, the just war doctrine may be described as a peren-
nial concept with a shifting content. From his perspective as a Chris-
tian theologian and moral thinker, Professor Johnson traces the
successive ideological phases of the just war doctrine.' Ranging con-
siderably wider than the period stated in his title, he follows the
doctrine's development from St. Augustine, the founder of the Chris-
tian doctrine of the just war, to commentators on the armed conflicts
of our own time, such as the war in Vietnam.
In the Introduction Johnson tells us that his book has two funda-
mental aims: "first, to explore the nature of the interaction between
religion and secular society, not just in the dissolution of just war
doctrine but also in its formation; and second, to investigate just war
doctrine as an ideological pattern of thought, expressive of a greater
ideology," 2 namely, the notion of justice common in pre-Reformation
Europe. The book's chief interest, to this reviewer, lies elsewhere, in its
consideration of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello3 as components
of the just war doctrine. The author unfortunately fails to explore the
historical and ideological interaction between the two; yet that in-
teraction must be clearly understood, if not for the sake of history,
then for the very practical reason that just war thinking is once again
ascendant, and the rules governing conduct in war may suffer as a
result.
- O.B.E., LL.B., LL.M., Professor of Law, University of Sussex, of the Honourable
Society of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, Fellow of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
1. J. JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND SECULR
CONCEPTS, 1200-1740 (1975) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 5.
3. The jus ad belluin is that part of international law governing resort to inter-
national armed conflicts. The jus in bello is the law of war properly so styled, namely,
the body of rules governing the conduct of parties engaged in international armed
conflict.
The Just War Doctrine
In Chapter I Johnson treats the emergence and fashioning of the
"classic just war doctrine." He sees the main constituents of this doc-
trine as two-fold, theological and secular. Johnson detects the theo-
logical element in the scholastic theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, who
derived it in part from St. Augustine; but the author also quite prop-
erly emphasizes the importance of the canon law tradition from
Gratian onwards. The doctrine received its first formulation in St.
Augustine's letter Contra Faustum. Therein St. Augustine asked the
critical question: "Is it necessarily sinful for a Christian to wage war?"
His negative and exceptive answer-that wars are just if waged to
avenge injustice or to coerce the enemies of the Church4-is generally
considered as the first appearance of the specifically Christian doctrine
of the just war.5 As he so often did, St. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa
Theologica, repeated and elaborated St. Augustine's view. The
Thomist formula embodies the medieval and scholastic thinking about
the just war and remains of great influence in the doctrine of the
Catholic Church today.0 Aquinas answered the question posed by St.
Augustine in the negative, provided: (i) the Prince had authorized the
war; (ii) there was a "just cause" against the adversary on account of
some guilt on his part; and (iii) the belligerent had a "right intention,"
i.e., to promote good or to avoid evil. The main emphasis was upon
the requirement of a just cause, which was considered to be a matter
of moral theology. Thus the Thomist view made the question of the
"justness" of all wars one that fell within the jurisdiction of the
Church.
Johnson finds the secular contribution to the formation and the
maturation of the classic just war doctrine in the chivalric ideals of
the knightly classes and in the conception of the iis gentium. That
concept first appeared in the writing of the Roman jurist Gaius (circa
165 A.D.) as "the law that natural reason establishes among all man-
kind [and] is followed by all peoples alike . . . as being the law
observed by all mankind." 7 It was contrasted with "natural law" (jus
naturale), which embodied those principles that, founded on the very
nature of man as a rational and social being, ought to control human
conduct. In time jus naturale and jus gentium came to be regarded as
the same set of rules seen from different points of view, for rules that
were everywhere observed (jus gentium) must surely be rules that the
4. P. 36.
5. See A. NUSSBAUM, A CoNcisE HISTORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS 35 (rev. ed. 1954).
6. See V COMMENTARY ON THE DOCUMENTS OF rATICAN II: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON
TIE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WoRr.D 354-55, 356-57 (H. Vongrimler ed. 1969); J. EPPSTEIN,
THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAw oF NATIONS 90-93 (1935).
7. I THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 3 (F. de Zulueta trans. 1946).
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rational nature of man prescribed for him ('us naturale), and vice
versa. Both the canon law and the military law ('us militare) were
seen as part of the jus gentium. Both were universally applied through-
out Christendom-the canon law to all clerics and, in many matters, to
all laymen, and the military law to all who followed the professions of
arms.
Having thus analyzed the strands that made up the fabric of the
classic just war doctrine of the late Middle Ages, the author proceeds
in Chapter II to consider what happened to the doctrine in the 16th
and early 17th centuries. Medieval Christendom by then had ceased
to be an ideological unity, the secular territorial states were emerging,
and Europe was, from 1618 to 1648, riven by the Thirty Years War.
This period of the bitter cleavage between Catholicism and Prot-
estantism generated its own ideological contribution to the just war
doctrine, described by Johnson as the "holy war" theory:8 "the exalta-
tion of a purely theological component of the jus ad bellum, war for
the cause of religion."9
Johnson contends that there was nothing inherent in holy war
theory that led to an absence of restraint in the prosecution of war
during the period.10 Yet restraint was lamentably absent. The trouble
was that the just war doctrine had relatively little to say about conduct
in warfare (jus in bello) beyond condemning perfidy (breach of prom-
ises) and the slaughter of women and children because war against
them was not "just." The lack of restraint was compounded by 14th
and 15th-century ideas that the victorious Prince was waging a just
war and, as the agent of God, punishing the defeated, as the devils in
hell would punish them in the next world. The victory was the judg-
ment of God as to the justness of the cause of the victor. The war
8. Pp. 81-82.
9. P. 22.
10. The author's contention is well-illustrated by his discussion of Cromwell's cam-
paign in Ireland. Historians differ as to what went wrong at Cromwell's sieges of
Drogheda and of Wexford in 1649, when the garrisons were butchered and a large
number of the inhabitants perished. Johnson prefers to think that the excess at Drogheda
is attributable not to the holy war doctrine but to the more mundane consideration
that the commander of the besieging forces got out of touch with his troops. P. 145. But
Cromwell's troops were, as Johnson himself points out, "ordinarily superbly disciplined."
Id. Indeed, Cromwell used that excellent "discipline" to carry out the atrocities at
Drogheda and Wexford, and his own explanation negatives Mr. Johnson's suggestion of
loss of control. As Cromwell explained later, he intended to punish the Irish for their
own appalling cruelties and to end further bloodshed by striking terror in the Irish. See
1 THE LITERS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER CROMWELL 'WITH ELUCIDATIONS BY THo.,sL
CARLYLE 465, 469, 486-87 (S. Lomas ed. 1904). Perhaps this may be one of the countless
examples of the theory of restraint in resort to war, jus ad belluni, having singularly
little effect upon the actual conduct in warfare.
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could not be considered just on both sides because God's will was not
divisible.
Chapter III concentrates upon the writings of the two great Spanish
theologian-jurists, Victoria and Suarez, and three English writers:
Ames, a Puritan theologian; Fulbecke, a lawyer; and Sutcliffe, a
courtier and divine. According to Johnson each of the Englishmen
excluded religion as a basis for the just war doctrine. He explains their
somewhat incongruous grouping with Victoria and Suarez by their
part in forming a bridge between the classic just war doctrine and
"the overtly secular war doctrine of modern international law.""
In Chapter IV he concentrates upon Grotius, Locke, and Vattel.
The span of these writers is considerable, namely from 1625, the date
of Grotius's great work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, to 1758, when Vattel
published Le Droit des Gens. Johnson's treatment of Grotius's ap-
proach to the just war doctrine is not the most satisfactory part of the
work, though he is not the first writer who has encountered difficulties
in attempting to analyze the shifting distinctions between bellum
justum and bellum injustum employed by Grotius.12 In fact, these dis-
tinctions never became part of international law. But Johnson is right
in pointing out that the writers he considers in this chapter removed
the last lingering traces of the medieval just war doctrine and thus
led to the modem doctrine, which is based, in his view, "entirely in
nature and agreements among men, with no backwards glances to
search out divine approval."' 3
A weakness in Johnson's work is his unsatisfactory grasp of legal
concepts, exemplified by his use of the phrase "nature and agree-
ments" to describe the sources of customary and conventional in-
ternational law. By choosing those terms he reveals that he entirely
disregards secular humanitarian rules of armed conflict, judicial
decisions, and "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."' 4 Earlier in the book, Johnson encountered a similar dif-
ficulty with the concept of the jus gentium and its very specific con-
nection with the law and custom of knights and men-at-arms. Also,
he pays little attention to the subtle but coherent hierarchy of legal
11. P. 22.
12. Grotius's unique contribution to the just war doctrine is primarily in the vigor
and clarity of his treatment of the topic. To him, a war must have a legal cause in
order to be "just," i.e., there must be a reason which would be recognized in a court of
law as a cause of action. II H. GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 394 (W. Whewell trans.
1853). See also I id. at 204, 206. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COLLECrED PAEtS 346-50 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975).
13. P. 23.
14. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1(c).
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regimes from the divine to the positive, which marked the thinking
of the scholastics.
It is appreciated that Mr. Johnson is considering the just war
doctrine as a theologian and moral theorist rather than as a lawyer.
Even so, a more serious shortcoming remains. Once the author has
brought the jus in bello, as well as the jus ad bellum, within the
purview of what he understands by the just war doctrine, the theory
of the one, no less than of the other, is germane to his topic. But our
writer fails, for instance, to pay sufficient attention to the place in
Grotius's work of the temperanta belli (moderations in war), which
afterwards were incorporated, in large part, into the modern inter-
national law of war.Y' Another great principle that Grotius stressed,
which receives no mention in the work under review and yet is highly
pertinent to the writer's central theme, is that the justice or injustice
of the war (jus ad bellum) is irrelevant for the purpose of determining
the obligation to observe the rules of warfare between the belligerents
(jus in bello).'6 Perhaps the reviewer may interpose at this point some
matters to which he ventures to think that Johnson has not given
sufficient attention, bearing in mind the express aims of the book.
The doctrine of the just war, religious or secular, has not had a
fortunate impact upon conduct in warfare. The central vice of the
medieval classic doctrine was that it oscillated between aggravation
of the cruelties in war, because the victorious Prince as the agent of
God was punishing the unjust defeated, and a high level of artificiality
that left it without an impact upon the content of the jus in bello.
In particular, it failed to give us the idea that the jus in bello applied
irrespective of the justness of the cause. This idea has in fact been
impeded by the long history of the just war doctrine and has taken
centuries to become established. It is true that the Christian doctrine
of charity was in theory capable of playing a part in restraining con-
duct in warfare. But however much it may be urged that the very
justness of the cause for resorting to war may demand charity in its
15. The teinperanla, which appear at the end of Grotius's work on war and peace,
were pleas for moderation of the brutal practices common to the belligerents in the
Thirty Years War, in progress when he wrote. At the time, 1625, Grotius put them
forward not as representing the law of war of the day. On the contrary they were an
expression of horror at what was happening and of shame that those practices were
then considered consonant with the law of nations. The ternperanta, Grotius urged,
were based upon the virtues of justice, mercy, charity, and honor. Advanced almost
tentatively as proposals for a better world, they became the most famous part of his
great work, remembered long after the elaborate discussions of the just and unjust war
had receded to the realm of historical curiosity. They became the prototypes of many of
the customary rules of warfare of the 18th and 19th centuries which were well-established
when the positivists began codifying such rules in the second half of the latter century.
16. III H. GRoTIUs, supra note 12, at 74-75.
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execution, or that the "right intention" with which it must be waged
demands restraint by an intent to do good and to avoid evil, these
ideas never really had a chance. The indivisibility of God's will was
too serious an impediment to the notion that a war might be just for
both sides engaged in it.17
It was, paradoxically, in the secular branch of the law of arms that
restraints, of a kind, were demanded and sometimes obtained, although
unfortunately such restraints operated only between members of the
military class. Some of the most appalling atrocities of medieval war-
fare were visited upon civilians (who had not the honor to carry arms)
at the hands of the military (for whom this privilege was reserved).
Yet this law of arms yielded ideas not without value for the sub-
sequent development of the modern international law of war. First,
it contributed the idea of a body of rules governing the military
class irrespective of frontiers or allegiance and irrespective of the
justice or injustice of the initial resort to war. Second, it affirmed the
idea that war, in its proper sense, could be waged only by sovereigns.
Restraint in the actual conduct of war became based on two con-
siderations, essentially neither religious nor moral. One was the hope
of financial gain and booty, to which a court would not give title
unless the prisoner or spoils had been taken in a "public and open"
war. The other was the chivalric idea that honor was the attribute of
the military class. Acts contrary to honor and good faith were con-
sidered incompatible with behavior expected of a knight and were
proscribed by law. What we would today call a war crime would, by
the 15th century, have been termed, with some legal precision, an act
contra fidem et jus gentium. Such an act often led to the public "dis-
honoring" of the offender. The law of arms of knights and professional
men-at-arms, the jus militare, had both canon and civil law bases con-
sidered as common to "the Roman peoples," a term that embraced all
people subject to Mother Church. This provided the idea of a body
of law, well-understood by canonists, civilians, knights, and heralds,
even if not regularly observed, that applied to the military class as
such. It was applied in the military and feudal courts universally.
This universal law of arms demanded one salient situation before
17. Victoria (1480-1546) may have been the first to apprehend that a war could be
just on both sides. Victoria accepted the earlier view that the victorious Prince was the
tool of divine punishment, but, finding it repugnant that in the war between the
Spaniards and the American Indians justness should rest solely with the former, he
posed the problem whether war could ever be just on both sides. Victoria's starting point
precluded a plainly affirmative answer, but he proposed that demonstrable or invincible
ignorance would excuse the unrighteous party. In this particular sense, a war could be
"just" on both sides. Sec A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 80, 82.
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it could become applicable: the war must be "public and open," i.e.,
waged by the authority of a Prince with the manifestations of war-
like conduct. Thus the medieval legacy of the just war did yield
something of value to posterity. Mainly under the force of Church
disapproval, expressed by anathema, it gave no place to private war
or indiscriminate foray, which were the curse of medieval society. To
such private wars the law of arms gave no color. Claims to ransoms and
spoils would not be upheld. It made some attempt to bring to book
professional freebooters whose behavior was synonymous with terror,
brutality, and looting.
The requirement that the war be public and open evolved out of
the Thomist formulation of the just war doctrine, which excluded the
"private war" of the feudal lord. The Thomist formula insisted that
for a war to be "just" it had to be "public." Gradually, the theological
and moral quality implicit in "just" disappeared, for no Prince would
admit that the wars he authorized were other than "just." Finally, war
came to be seen as a proper war with legal rights for those engaged in
it if it was waged "openly," i.e., by armed men in formation, display-
ing flags and pennants. The normal historical reversal then took place
and the "openness" of the conflict became conclusive evidence of the
existence of a "war." Once the modem territorial states had been
established, their resort to arms became open by necessity, and soon
no form of fighting could properly be a war other than that waged by
a sovereign state.
In the second half of the 19th century, under the impact of a
collection of ideals that might be termed secular humanitarianism,
the laws and customs of war were subjected to a major codifying
redaction at the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences of 1899
and 1907. This was the era of positivism, the high noon of state
sovereignty, and the virtual expulsion of the just war doctrine from
the picture. States might, in accepted international law of the day,
resort to war as a legitimate instrument of national policy.
With the gradual recession of that claim, through the progressive
stages of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris,
and the United Nations Charter, a new doctrine of the just and law-
ful war-limited to individual or collective self-defense-and of collec-
tive peace enforcement appeared as the new jus ad bellum. Necessarily,
the old question reappears: Does the jus in bello bind the aggressor
and the self-defender alike? Some would argue that waging an aggres-
sive war is the supreme international criminal act and that those who
take part in such a war are participants in this criminality and are not
entitled to the protection of jus in bello. Such arguments would bring
376
Vol. 86: 370, 1976
The Just War Doctrine
us back to the evils of the medieval classic just war doctrine and all
the miseries that accompanied it. The humanitarian law theory and its
associate, the human rights theory, reject discrimination among
participants in war whether on the side of the aggressor or of the
defender. The Grotian principle will have to hold firm unless all that
has been gained in the development of the humanitarian law of armed
conflicts is to be in peril. Perhaps the secular and more modest tradi-
tion of a law of arms, expanded with a humanitarian content aimed
at restrictions upon entire classes of weaponry and the maximum
protection of those defenseless in enemy hands, civilians and civilian
objects, may be a more rewarding endeavour than the resurrection of
just war doctrines with an ideological charge.
Nevertheless, it must be said that we are indebted to Johnson for
pointing out that we may not have heard the last of the just war
doctrine, although its content has moved far from its classical form.
The jus in bello confers no legality upon those wars the resort to which
was illegal and criminal. Let us hope that no new doctrine of jus ad
bellum, of whatever ideology, will be allowed to undermine and negate
the humanitarian restraints that are to be found, in increasing
strength, in the modern and renovated jus in beilo.
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